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 ABSTRACT 
 This thesis is a case study in how weak campaign finance laws and government 
oversight can undermine democracy in a local election.  It does so by demonstrating 
how Louisiana campaign finance law enabled one wealthy businessman to play a major 
role in a mayoral election under the auspices of an issue-based political action 
committee. Through the examination of the Louisiana PAC BRNext, its financial 
activities, and its relationships, this study suggests that BRNext and its founder Lane 
Grigsby were able to violate the spirit of the law in each of these areas. BRNext was able 
to take advantage of the loophole-ridden and vague Louisiana campaign finance law, 
opening the electoral process up to the possibility for corruption. After discussing how 
this mayoral election illustrates the failure of Louisiana’s legal frameworks to achieve 
core goals of campaign finance law, this study makes suggestions for adapting policy 
by taking into account new political actors and new routes for spending. 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2004 Baton Rouge mayoral race was entrenched in controversy across party 
and racial lines. Following the primary, Melvin ‚Kip‛ Holden (D), an African-
American, and Bobby Simpson (R), the white incumbent mayor in a predominantly 
black city, faced each other in a runoff, a rematch of the 2000 mayoral election. This 
time, however, the local political action committee (PAC) BRNext was in Holden’s 
corner. On election day, in a landmark victory, Holden won with more than 55 percent 
of the vote, a jump up from the 43 percent he received in 2000.1 And in unseating 
Simpson, Holden became the first African-American mayor of Baton Rouge.   
 What changed from the 2000 election? Researchers, journalists, and even the 
defeated Simpson all credited BRNext with making the difference. BRNext appeared 
after the general election, broadcasting a series of television advertisements and 
presenting itself as an issue-based group and a community coalition for change. Many 
of its initial advertisements supported this claim, focusing on general issues like crime 
and traffic. Closer to the run-off, however, the PAC began airing attack ads against 
Simpson. During and following the election, many people behind the scenes questioned 
the legitimacy of BRNext, its sources of funding, and its intentions.2  A closer look at 
BRNext suggests that, rather than operating as a grassroots organization comprised of 
community members, it was actually a campaign waged and bankrolled by one man, 
                                                 
1
 Scott Dyer, Clean Campaign Vowed BRNext to Continue Ad Plan, THE ADVOCATE, September 20, 2004.  
2 Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005). 
Kennedy said, ‚Yeah, people were suspicious of BRNext. Louisiana blogs buzzed about Grigsby and who 
else was behind the group.‛ 
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Lane Grigsby, and his corporations—corporations whose business interests were 
affected considerably by those in office.  
 Did this landmark election reflect an open, fair, and equitable democracy at work 
or was it a reflection of money’s corrupting power in politics? Was Grigsby exercising 
his right to free speech or was he using his corporate wealth to dominate the political 
discourse in the 2004 mayor’s race? Evidence suggests the latter. 
 To determine whether money has a corrupting influence on politics and whether 
campaign finance laws are beneficial, scholars have conducted broad quantitative 
studies.3 These studies focus primarily on the use of money in congressional elections,4  
voter turnout in relation to campaign spending,5 and public funding of electoral 
campaigns.6 In terms of qualitative analysis there is no shortage of anecdotal case 
studies, however, there are very few qualitative case studies in terms of systematic 
academic studies.7 Such case studies offer an opportunity for in-depth examination of 
                                                 
3 DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN 
AMERICA (1975); Ruth Jones, State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics, 25 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 342 (1981); Karen J. Fling, The State as Laboratories of Reform. In POLITICAL 
FINANCE 245(Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1979);  Ruth S. Jones, Financing State Elections, in MONEY AND 
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984); David C. Nice, Political Equality and 
Campaign Finance in the American States, 65 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 183 (1984).  
4
 Karen J. Fling, The State as Laboratories of Reform. In POLITICAL FINANCE 245(Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1979);  
Ruth S. Jones, Financing State Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (Michael J. Malbin 
ed., 1984); David C. Nice, Political Equality and Campaign Finance in the American States, 65 SOCIAL SCIENCE 
QUARTERLY 183 (1984). GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); Stanton A. Glantz, 
Alan I. Abramowitz, & Michael P. Burkart, Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?, 38 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 
1033 (1976). 
5
 Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Getting out the vote: participation in Gubernatorial Elections, 77 
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 675 (1983). 
6
 DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN 
AMERICA (1975); Ruth Jones, State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics, 25 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 342 (1981). 
7 Robert J. Huckshorn, Who Gave it? Who Got It?: The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws in the States, 47 
JOURNAL OF POLITICS 773 (1985);  GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); Stanton 
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the competing constitutional interests of political speech and the political integrity of 
the electoral process. Political speech as a First Amendment right has been examined in 
terms of federal law quite a bit.8 Little has been done in terms of examining this speech 
on the state level, and even less has been done on the local level.9 This study looks at the 
financial hijacking of the 2004 Baton Rouge mayoral race under current Louisiana 
campaign finance law. The purpose of this study is to address the appearance of 
corruption on the state and local level, and suggest that this advances the current 
argument for campaign finance reform. It does so through analysis of state and federal 
law; examination of campaign finance records; and in-depth interviews with BRNext 
founder Lane Grigsby, media consultant George Kennedy, fundraiser Chris Hicks, and 
former Deputy General Counsel of the Louisiana Ethics Board Maris Leblanc. 
 Chapter 1 discusses the current debate surrounding campaign finance reform 
and pertinent court rulings, and explains the direction of this study. Chapter 2 defines 
key terminology, gives a brief history of campaign finance reform, and explains current 
                                                                                                                                                             
A. Glantz, Alan I. Abramowitz, & Michael P. Burkart, Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?, 38 
JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1033 (1976). 
8 William F. Buckley, Jr., About Nikpak, NATIONAL REVIEW (May 15, 1981);  Charles T. McConville, 
Muzzling the Mouthless Speaker: The Reform Community’s Prescription for “Corporate Domination” in State 
Issue Campaigns, 35 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 245 (2006); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A 
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 69 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1045 (July, 
1985); Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse Over Corporate and 
Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDOZA LAW REVIEW 1343 (April, 1993). 
9 Margery M. Ambrosius, The Role of Occupational Interest Groups in State Economic Development Policy-
Making, 42 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 53 (1989); VIRGINIA GRAY & DAVID LOWERY, THE POLITICAL 
ECOLOGY OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION: LOBBYING COMMUNITIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1996);  RONALD 
J. HERBENAR & CLIVE S. THOMAS, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (1992); Kenneth G. 
Hunter, Laura Ann Wilson & Gregory Brunk, Societal Complexity and Interest Group Lobbying in the 
American States, 53 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 488 (1991); ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS AND 
LOBBYING IN THE STATES (2001). 
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Louisiana campaign finance law. Chapter 3 gives a detailed account of BRNext’s role in 
the 2004 mayoral race. Chapter 4 outlines key research findings, discusses their 
implications for democracy, and makes suggestions for campaign finance policy reform. 
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the impact that cases like BRNext have 
on democracy and the importance of additional reform. 
 5 
TWO COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS 
 Free Speech v. Political Integrity of the Electoral Process 
 The introduction of campaign finance law incited the battle between two 
competing constitutional interests: freedom of speech and the preservation of a healthy 
democracy. Since the Tillman Act of 190710 attempted to curtail corporate capital’s 
influence on politics, Congress, the Supreme Court, and state legislatures have debated 
whether spending money in a campaign is political speech that should be protected or 
whether it corrupts the political process by allowing those with wealth to unfairly 
influence elections and, ultimately, government policy. On one side, there are those 
who argue that campaign finance restrictions, such as bans on corporate contributions, 
are a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech.11 On the other side, those in 
favor of greater restriction seek to protect the political integrity of the electoral process 
from what they believe to be the corrupting influence of money. 
 Those against additional campaign finance restrictions argue that because money 
is a means to participate in political speech, campaign contributions and expenditures 
are entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amendment.12 The notion of 
money as speech by proxy can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 1976 landmark 
                                                 
10 Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864. 
11 J. Tobin Grant & Thomas J. Rudolph, Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the Issue of Campaign Finance, 47 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 453 (July 2003). 
12 Mitch McConnell, In Defense of Soft Money, NEW YORK TIMES, April 1, 2001; Bradley A. Smith, Money 
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 45 (1997); Bradley 
A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft Money Ban, 179 JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATION 179 (1998); Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 1 (1999); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001). 
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decision in Buckley v. Valeo, in which the court struck down FECA’s limits on campaign 
expenditures. The Court asserted that ‚*a+ restriction on the amount of money a person 
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces 
the quantity of expression<because virtually every means of communicating ideas in 
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.‛13  Along the same sentiment, 
the ACLU deemed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, a law that was 
designed to close existing contribution loopholes, as ‚a recipe for political repression 
because it egregiously violates longstanding free speech rights...‛14 And when the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the key provisions of BCRA, Justice Antonin Scalia declared it "a 
sad day for freedom of speech" in his dissenting opinion, and added: "Who could have 
imagined the court would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the 
First Amendment is meant to protect: The right to criticize the government."15 
 Advocates of more stringent campaign finance regulation posit two primary 
arguments: The first is that the undue influence of money undermines political equality 
by allowing the wealthy to dominate political debate and creates a situation that can 
foster quid pro quo political corruption. Second, these advocates argue that this 
undermining of political debate and political integrity, creates an atmosphere of public 
cynicism and voter apathy.16 In Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political 
                                                 
13 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). 
14 Laura Murphy & Joel Gora, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S3135, March 29, 2001. 
15 McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). In dissenting opinion. 
16 DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (1975); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE 
SPEECH (1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An 
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1996), 
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Campaigns, Darrell West argues that due to a rise in independent expenditures, election 
costs, issue advocacy, and candidates’ dependence on third-parties, elections no longer 
stimulate debate over ideas and policies, but instead, have degenerated into contests in 
which candidates try to raise more and more money.17 The overall argument here is that 
if a minority of wealthy individuals dominates the political discourse, that discourse 
will only reflect the interests of that elite group.  
 In addition to stifling debate, proponents of stringent campaign finance law 
argue that economic inequalities pose a serious threat to political egalitarianism by 
giving big corporations and wealthy individuals a disproportionate share of influence 
in politics.18 These reform proponents argue that campaign contributions often translate 
into access to politicians or legislative action.19 Jamin Raskin, Associate Professor of Law 
at The American University, summed up this argument when he said, ‚Political 
corruption in America today does not consist simply of quid pro quo relationships 
                                                                                                                                                             
Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1627 
(1999); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1609 (1999),Burt Neuborne, Toward a 
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1055 
(1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE LAW AND POLICY 
REVIEW 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUMBIA LAW 
REVIEW 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the 
Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1126 (1994); DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK 
DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000). 
17 DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000). 
18 OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional 
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons 
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 1 (1996); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW 1627 (1999); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1609 (1999); Burt 
Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 1055 (1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealthy Primary, 11 YALE 
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 
COLUMBIA REVIEW 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to 
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1126 (1994). 
19 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) at 26-27. 
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between special interests and elected officials. It involves a massive structural bias in 
government favoring the parochial interests of corporate and personal wealth over the 
interests of those citizens lacking access to such wealth.‛20 He argues that economic 
elites hide behind the First Amendment as a way to ensure their freedom to continue 
buying elections.21  
 As a result of such corruption, these reform proponents argue that the general 
public has given up on the integrity of the system. They contend that this has translated 
into lower turnout rates and less overall political participation. Former Congressman 
Lee Hamilton, director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, echoed this 
sentiment when he said, ‚The rising flood of money that flows into campaigns also 
undermines general public trust in the political system. Many Americans feel it is 
money, not ideas and not principles, that reigns supreme in our political system. I often 
heard people say that the political process was run by moneyed interests, so they saw 
little reason to vote.‛22  
The Courts’ Debate 
 While the Supreme Court deems political speech at the core of the First 
Amendment, it too has been torn over the question of whether money, corporate or 
otherwise, equals protected speech. There are two outlooks reflected in the Court’s 
                                                 
20
 Jamin Raskin, Associate Professor of Law at The American University, Letter to the BOSTON REVIEW 
(1993), http://bostonreview.net/BR18.3/forum.html. Commenting on Ellen Miller’s Money, Politics and 
Democracy. 
21 Id. 
22 Lee Hamilton, The Money Chase, The Center on Congress at Indiana University, October 3, 2005,  
http://congress.indiana.edu/radio commentaries/the money chase.php 
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decisions: that political speech should be protected at any cost and that some speech must 
be restricted to maintain and/or restore the integrity of the electoral process. 
 Throughout the 70s and early 80s, Court decisions emphasized the importance of 
the citizen’s right to receive information in the marketplace of ideas, regardless of 
whether that information, or speech, comes from individuals or corporations. In Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,23 the Court reasoned that 
‚speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project 
it, as in a paid advertisement<‛24 The Court later reasoned that the free flow of 
information through advertising serves the First Amendment goal of enlightening public 
decision-making in a democratic society.25 This is in line with Justice Brennan’s 1965 
argument that the best way to ascertain the truth is to have ‚uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open‛ discussion, as in a ‚free marketplace of ideas.‛26 
 Two years after the Virginia ruling, the Court went beyond the protection of 
advertisements as a means to market products and specifically addressed the right of 
corporations to participate in political discourse. In First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti,27 the Court ruled that corporate ‚speech *is+ indispensable to decision-making in a 
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather 
than an individual.‛28 The Court reaffirmed this decision in Citizens Against Rent Control 
                                                 
23 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
24 Id. at 762. 
25 Id. at 765. 
26 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) in majority opinion. 
27 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
28 Id. at 777. 
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v. City of Berkeley29 when it determined that ‚there is no significant state or public interest 
in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure. Placing limits on contributions 
which in turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression.‛30  
 In the 90s, however, the Court began to show concern with the ability of corporate-
level wealth to exert undue influence in the marketplace of ideas. In 1990, for example, 
the Court ruled in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce31 that ‚*c+orporate wealth can 
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures, 
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions<‘The compelling 
governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence 
of political war chests funneled through the corporate form.’‛32 The Court upheld 
Michigan’s efforts ‚aim*ed+ at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.‛33 This ruling was a significant shift from the 
argument in favor of corporate influence in the 70s and 80s and reflected the growing 
concern of money’s corrupting power in politics.  
 Despite the Court’s ruling in Austin upholding a state’s right to protect the 
electoral process from the corruption of corporate wealth, in 2000 the Court struck down 
a ban on corporate contributions in state ballot issue campaigns in Montana Chamber of 
                                                 
29 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). 
30 Id. at 299. 
31 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
32 Id. at 659 
33 Id. at 654, 659-60. 
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Commerce v. Argenbright.34 In its opinion, the Court reverted back to the decision in Bellotti, 
stating that it ‚is up to the voters to determine whether they approve or disapprove of a 
corporation’s point of view.‛35 Despite this ruling, FECA still currently prohibits 
corporate contributions on the federal level and 21 states presently have similar 
prohibitions on corporate contributions.36  
 As this chapter outlines, there is an ongoing battle in the federal and state 
legislatures, as well as in the courts, concerning whether restrictions on political speech 
are necessary to preserve meaningful democracy or whether they are a violation of the 
First Amendment. In 1976 the Supreme Court struck down parts of FECA as a violation 
of First Amendment rights in Buckley v. Valeo. The Court, however, upheld limits on 
individual contributions to candidates for Congress. The Court reasoned that this 
restriction would directly serve the government’s interest in preventing ‚corruption and 
the appearance of corruption.‛ 37  Since Buckley, the Supreme Court’s rulings on 
campaign finance law have hinged on concrete proof of campaign corruption or the 
appearance of corruption. This has set the standard, which requires that those seeking 
campaign finance reform provide proof of such corruption. The purpose of this study is 
to provide proof of such corruption in order to further the argument for additional 
campaign finance reform. Although proving definitive ‚corruption‛ is beyond the scope 
of this study, it does show the undue influence of money in politics, and how existing 
                                                 
34  Montgomery Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049, 1052--53 (9th Cir. 2000). 
35 Citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990)) at 600. 
36 According to the Public Affairs Council at 
http://www.pac.org/page/ethics/StatesthatProhibitCorporateContributions.shtml 
37 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976). 
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legal frameworks give a disproportionate voice to the wealthy. In addition, it shows the 
‚appearance of corruption,‛ 38  which the Court has ruled to be damaging to the electoral 
process, creating voter cynicism and apathy. 
                                                 
38 Id. 
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THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE 
 To understand the philosophical debate surrounding free political speech and 
political integrity of the electoral process, it is necessary to first understand current 
campaign finance laws, what they attempt to do, and how they attempt to do it. This 
chapter provides a brief overview of federal campaign finance legislation and defines 
key terminology. To give context to this case study, it also addresses how Louisiana 
campaign finance law differs from federal law.  
Key Components of Federal Campaign Finance Law 
 The struggle over campaign finance has long been a hallmark of American 
politics. Congress passed the Tillman Act of 190739 in its first attempt to curtail 
campaign contributions by corporations.  Congress passed the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) of 197140 in an effort to gain control over the increasing influence 
of money in politics. Following the Watergate scandal and the rising costs of campaigns, 
Congress amended FECA in 197441 to protect against new avenues of corruption. As the 
first comprehensive attempt to regulate federal campaign financing, FECA consisted of 
the following elements: 
 Oversight. The Act established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for the 
oversight and enforcement of campaign finance laws. The FEC is charged with  
                                                 
39 Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
40 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 431-456 (2000). 
41 FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 403, 88 Stat. 1263, 1291-93 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. 9001-9013 (2000)) 
 14 
disclosing campaign finance information, enforcing limits and prohibitions on 
contributions, and overseeing public funding of presidential elections.42  
 Disclosure. Certain contributions and expenditures used to influence federal 
elections must be reported to the FEC so it can make these disclosure reports available 
to the public. Disclosure is supposed to ensure that the public can easily find the 
financial sources of campaign messages.43  
 Individual Contributions. Contributions comprise the giving of money or 
anything of value to a federal candidate or political committee for its use in influencing 
federal elections. FECA placed limits on contributions by individuals and groups to 
candidates, party committees, and PACs. These limits were changed in 2002 by BCRA. 
Currently on the federal level, individuals can give up to $2,300 per candidate, per 
election period; up to $28,500 per national party committee, per calendar year; up to 
$10,000 per state, local, and district party committee, combined per calendar year; and 
up to $5,000 per Political Action Committee, per calendar year.44 
 Individual Expenditures. According to federal law, expenditures differ from 
contributions in that the spender maintains control over how the money is ultimately 
used. There are two forms of expenditures, independent and coordinated. Independent 
expenditures are made without coordinating with a candidate, a candidate’s committee, 
                                                 
42 Federal Election Commission, Federal Election Campaign Laws (October 2005) at 40. 
43 Id. at 1. 
44 Id. at 2. 
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or political party. If expenditures are made in "coordination"45 with a campaign, 
however, they may be regulated as contributions, subject to the same limits and 
disclosure requirements.46 FECA limited expenditures by candidates and associated 
committees, limited independent expenditures to $1000, and limited candidate 
expenditures from personal funds. 
 In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo47 questioned the constitutionality of FECA’s limits on 
independent expenditures. The Court upheld federal limits on campaign contributions, 
but ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally 
protected free speech. In striking down limits on campaign expenditures, the Court 
determined that the laws could limit political contributions and spending only when 
official candidate campaigns were involved, not when individuals and groups were 
expressing political opinions. In terms of advertising, to establish that the message is 
connected with an official candidate campaign, the Court required the use of the 
phrases like ‚vote for,‛ ‚elect,‛ or ‚defeat.‛ 
 Corporate Participation. FECA prohibited corporations from making campaign 
contributions or expenditures to a federal candidate’s campaign. Corporations could, 
however, set up PACs and solicit contributions to those PACs from its executives and 
shareholders. In 1978, however, the Supreme Court ruled in First National Bank of Boston 
v. Bellotti48 that a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting the expenditure of 
                                                 
45 Coordination is defined by the FEC as consulting, cooperating, or working in concert with or at the 
request or suggestion of a candidate or party committee 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). 
48 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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corporate funds ‚for the purpose of<influencing or affecting‛ voters’ opinions 
infringed on corporations’ ‚protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling 
state interest.‛49 Despite this ruling, corporations cannot make expenditures in 
connection with federal elections. The prohibition on corporate contributions and 
expenditures on the federal level has led to the development of new avenues for putting 
money into campaigns, such as PACs and independent expenditures. 
 PACs. Stringent campaign finance laws put in place by the FEC coupled with the 
rising cost of campaigns resulted in the increase of Political Action Committees (PACs) 
and other interest groups as an avenue for additional campaign fund raising and 
spending. PACs today, accused of distorting the democratic process, were viewed by 
reformers of the 1970s as a way for individuals with common interests to get together to 
make a difference in politics. Political Action Committees (PACs) are political 
committees that come in two forms: connected PACs and non-connected PACs. 
Connected PACs or candidate committees are official committees of federal candidates. 
Non-connected PACs, also known as independent PACs, are not officially affiliated 
with another entity. On the federal level, PACs have higher contribution limits than 
individual contributors. They can contribute up to $5,000 per election to a federal 
candidate; $15,000 annually to any national party committee, and $5,000 annually to 
any other PAC. Federal PACs may be given up to $5,000 from any one individual.50  
  
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Federal Election Commission, Federal Election Campaign Laws (October 2005). 
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            Post-Buckley politics have seen a significant rise in independent expenditures 
through non-connected PACs including the 1980s expenditures by the American 
Medical Association PAC and the Realtors’ PAC and the 1996 independent campaigns 
launched by the AFL-CIO against Republican freshmen.51 Many argue that these non-
connected PACs are ‚loopholes’ in the system of campaign finance regulation that need 
to be closed.52 Because these non-connected PACs can spend in ways that parties 
cannot, National Conservative Political Action Committee Chairman Terry Dolan said: 
‚A group like ours can lie through its teeth, and the candidate it helps stays clean.‛53 
Others, however, contend that these groups contribute much needed participation to 
the political process.54  
 Researching the effects of these non-connected PACs is often limited to the 
reporting of total amounts of money spent specifically for and against candidates. For 
this reason, much research dealing with these expenditures is concerned with their 
uncontrolled influence over elections without restriction or accountability.55 In 1985, 
Michael Malbin observed that these ‚independent‛ expenditures are often ‚The first 
method for getting around limits that crosses most people’s minds<‛56 Larry Sabato 
similarly argued that these groups are the ‚least accountable form of campaign 
                                                 
51 Engstrom & Kenny, supra, at 885. 
52 Viveca Novak & Jean Cobb, The Kindness of Strangers, 5 COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE 32 (1987).  
53 Myra MacPherson, The New Right Brigade, WASHINGTON POST, August 10, 1980. 
54 William F. Buckley, Jr., About Nikpak, NATIONAL REVIEW (May 15, 1981). 
55 LARRY MANKINSON, OPEN SECRETS: THE DOLLAR POWER OF PACS IN CONGRESS (1990); Viveca Novak & 
Jean Cobb, The Kindness of Strangers. 5 COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE 32 (1987). 
56 Michael J. Malbin, You Get What You Pay For, but Is That What You Want?, in BEFORE NOMINATION: OUR 
PRIMARY PROBLEMS (George Grassmuch ed., 1985) at 80.  
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spending‛57 that frequently use ‚negative, even vicious, messages and tactics *making+ 
any sort of civility in politics much more difficult to achieve.‛58 
Other Campaign Finance “Battlegrounds” 
 As campaign finance reformists struggle to address existing loopholes in the law, 
the rise of new political actors and avenues for spending create new loopholes and a 
need for address by the Court and the FEC. Additional areas of concern over campaign 
finance are as follows:    
 Issue Advocacy. As one avenue for political participation, issue advocacy 
became popular starting in the late 1970s. The Annenberg Public Policy Center59 
estimates that organizations spent more than two million dollars on issue advertising in 
Washington DC in 2001 and 2002.60 There are two types of advocacy recognized in 
federal elections: express advocacy and issue advocacy. According to federal 
regulations, express advocacy is advocacy that uses particular ‚magic words‛61 like 
‚elect,‛ ‚defeat,‛ ‚vote for,‛ or ‚vote against,‛ or when taken as a whole the 
communication can only be interpreted by a ‚reasonable person‛ as advocating the 
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s). Under law, issue 
                                                 
57 LARRY J. SABATO, PAYING FOR ELECTIONS (1989) at 20.  
58 Id. at 70. 
59 Established in 1993, the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania conducts 
and disseminates research, hosts lectures and conferences, and convenes roundtable discussions that 
highlight important questions about the intersection of media, communication, and public policy. The 
Policy Center, which has offices in Philadelphia and Washington DC, conducts ongoing research in the 
areas of political communication, information and society, media and the developing child, health 
communication and adolescent risk.  
60 Issue ads: Spending by organization, ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER,  Available Online at: 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/issueads/spending_org.htm (2003). 
61 as defined in Buckley. 
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advocacy is defined as that which addresses issues, rather than candidates. Because 
issue advocacy was viewed as independent from any candidate, prior to 2002 it was 
completely unregulated.   
 Corporate Issue Advocacy. While corporations cannot make coordinated 
contributions and expenditures, they can participate through issue advocacy. In 1978 
the United States Supreme Court ruled in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti62 that 
corporations had a First Amendment right to make contributions in order to attempt to 
influence political processes. In his opinion, Justice Lewis Powell ruled that a 
Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting the expenditure of corporate funds "for the 
purpose of ... influencing or affecting" voters' opinions infringed on corporations' 
"protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest."63 Others, 
however, worry that this gives corporations a chance to corrupt the process with 
corporate money. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist articulated why he felt 
giving corporations this freedom might be dangerous: ‚A State grants to a business 
corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its 
efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those properties, 
so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.‛64 
 Pseudo-Issue Advocacy. As a result of Buckley’s ruling, parties and PACs often 
produce ‚issue advertising,‛ which supports or opposes specific candidates, but avoids 
the phrases outlined in Buckley. According to the Wisconsin Democratic Party the new 
                                                 
62 First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
63 Id. in concurring opinion. 
64 Id. in dissenting opinion. 
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trend is hijacking of political elections by special interest groups using pseudo-issue 
advocacy.65 The party goes on to describe ‚phony issue ads‛ as those that remain under 
the radar of expenditure regulations by avoiding the magic words ‚vote for‛ or ‚vote 
against.‛  By doing so, these individuals or groups are not required to disclose the 
funding sources for the advertising.  Due to this lack of disclosure, it is difficult to track 
where the money is coming from and how much of it there is.66   
 Soft Money. Beyond issue advocacy, individuals and PACs have discovered 
additional ways to spend money ‚outside‛ official candidates’ campaigns. Campaign 
money comes in two forms: ‚hard money‛ and ‚soft money.‛ Hard money refers to 
donations made directly to political candidates. These donations must be declared with 
the name of the donor, which becomes public knowledge, and are limited by legislation. 
Soft money is money that is not made directly to a candidate's campaign, but is spent on 
an activity, such as issue advocacy or grassroots efforts.  
 In 1979 FECA was amended to allow party committees to accept and spend 
unlimited amounts of soft money during campaign elections. The Act intended the 
money to be spent on grass roots ‚getting out the vote efforts,‛67 but following passage, 
the parties began using the money on political issue advertising. As long as these ads 
avoided the phrases outlined in Buckley, the parties circumvented finance restrictions 
and disclosure.  
                                                 
65 Hijacking, Wisconsin Democracy Campaign Website (2003, July 14), 
http://www.wisdc.org/ind02how.html 
66 Id. 
67 FECA Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, §§ 101303, 93 Stat. 1339, 1339-69 
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 As a result, in 2002 Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA)68 prohibiting the raising and spending of soft money by federal officeholders, 
candidates, and national parties. It severely restricted the use of soft money by state and 
local parties in relation to federal election activities, 69 in an attempt to curb the influence 
of corporate and labor money in federal elections. Despite the breadth of BCRA’s 
restrictions, many politicians and members of Congress argue that BCRA does not 
directly or conclusively address the increasingly significant impact of non-connected 
PACs and independent expenditures. They argue that these supposedly issue-based 
political organizations are able to escape the contribution limits imposed on parties, 
campaign committees, candidates, and officials, while continuing to ‚engage in thinly-
veiled partisan activities.‛70 
 In 2003 McConnell v. FEC71 challenged BCRA, but the Supreme Court upheld 
‚Congress’ effort to plug the soft money loophole and its regulation of electioneering 
communications.‛72  However, the Court invalidated the Act’s requirement that parties 
choose between either making independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures 
on behalf of candidates. In addition, the Court contended that campaign finance 
regulations are only justifiable to curtail the type of corruption that causes a change in 
legislative votes. It argued that soft money can lead not only to changes in legislative 
                                                 
68 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) (popularly referred to as the 
"McCain-Feingold" legislation after its Senate sponsors). 
69 A. J. Rosenthal, 527 Regulation and the Trickle-Down Effect, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, 8 (2004). 
70 A. J. Rosenthal, 527 Regulation and the Trickle-Down Effect, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, 8 (2004). 
71 McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
72 Id. in majority opinion. 
 22 
votes, but manipulation in various aspects of legislative business. While this ruling 
affects the use of corporate and union money in all federal elections, it has not been 
applied to elections on the state and local level. 
Louisiana Law 
 With a former governor currently behind bars, a Congressman currently under 
indictment for soliciting bribes, money laundering, and racketeering (to name a few), 
Louisiana is a state with what political scientist Wayne Parent refers to as ‚an 
unparalleled record of political corruption.‛73 In 1949 V. O. Key singled Louisiana out in 
his classic work Southern Politics in a chapter titled ‚The Seamy Side of Democracy.‛74 
Given such, Louisiana is a good place to examine campaign finance law and local 
manifestations of political corruption.  
 Oversight. To understand the case of BRNext, it is important to understand areas 
in which Louisiana campaign finance laws are similar to federal law and areas in which 
they differ from federal law. One area in which the two are similar is the area of 
oversight. On the federal level the FEC oversees and enforces campaign finance 
regulations. In Louisiana, campaign finance is overseen by the Louisiana Board of 
Ethics and the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance. The Louisiana Board of 
Ethics is empowered to administer and enforce laws within its jurisdiction, represent 
the public interest in the administration of any law, and offer and enter into consent 
                                                 
73 WAYNE PARENT, INSIDE THE CARNIVAL: UNMASKING LOUISIANA POLITICS 2 (2004). 
74 V. O. KEY JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS (1949). 
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opinions regarding violations of law.75 The board consists of eleven members, seven 
appointees selected by the governor and two each nominated by the House and 
Senate.76  Board members are supported by an administrative staff which consists of an 
Ethics Administrator, a Deputy General Counsel, and four supporting attorneys.  
 The FEC has been called the ‚toothless tiger.‛77 The Louisiana Ethics Board is 
also worthy of this name. The board, solid in theory, is in reality rendered ineffective by 
vague laws and poor structure. According to former Deputy General Counsel of the 
Louisiana Ethics Board, Maris LeBlanc, violations of Louisiana campaign finance law 
are difficult to detect and prosecute.78 Rather than actively seeking violations, the 
Louisiana Ethics Board relies on filed complaints by those knowledgeable of illegal or 
unethical activity. For example, a case was brought to the attention of the Ethics Board 
concerning the 1987 campaign of Doug Green, a candidate for Insurance Commissioner. 
After investigating the complaint, Green was found to have accepted more than $2 
million from a different number of companies funded by a family that owned a local 
insurance company. Many of those involved were sentenced to federal prison.79 Leblanc 
said had this not been brought to the attention of the Board by a knowledgeable party, 
it may have gone unnoticed.80 
                                                 
75 Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 202 
76 House Chooses Two New Ethics Board Members, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Available online at 
www.theadvocate.com, (2007). 
77 Amanda S. LaForge, The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement, 
10 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL 351 (1996). 
78 Interview with Maris E. Leblanc, former Deputy General Counsel for the Louisiana Board of Ethics, in 
Baton Rouge, La. (Feb. 28, 2007). 
79 Pleas by Insurance Officials, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1990, AP story. 
80 Interview with Maris E. Leblanc, former Deputy General Counsel for the Louisiana Board of Ethics, in 
Baton Rouge, La. (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 24 
 Disclosure. In addition, the board is charged with disclosing contributions and 
expenditures, as well as investigating any alleged violations of the law. Financial 
reports are disclosed through the Ethics Board website.  
 Contributions. Disclosure is important in Louisiana, considering the many 
avenues for contribution. Louisiana law differs significantly from federal law in that it 
allows corporations to contribute directly to candidates and committees. In Louisiana, 
individuals and corporations may give up to $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign or 
candidate PAC.  A candidate PAC, which is treated differently than an independent 
PAC, can then contribute a maximum of $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign – unless it is a 
Big PAC, 81 in which case it can contribute up to $10,000.  Contributions, in-kind 
contributions, loans, endorsements, or guarantees on loans are all counted toward the 
contribution limits.82   However, if the PAC is ‚non-connected‛ or ‚independent‛ – if it 
is set up for issue advocacy, not candidate endorsement – then individuals and 
corporations may contribute up to $100,000.83  
 Expenditures. In addition to contributions, individuals and corporations can 
make expenditures in efforts to affect elections. As on the federal level, Louisiana 
expenditures are classified either as independent or coordinated. Individuals, 
corporations, and PACs can make unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of a 
candidate. If the expenditures are coordinated, however, they are considered in-kind 
                                                 
81 On the federal level and in many other states, these groups are referred to as Super PACs. 
82 R. S.18:1505.2 H, K 
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contributions and subject to contribution limits.84 Leblanc says the Louisiana law is very 
clear about the prohibition of coordination between non-connected PACs and 
candidates. According to the law, expenditures made in coordination with a candidate 
or candidate PAC are considered contributions and subject to the contribution limits.85 
However, Leblanc admits, ‚It’s easy to see that is the rule, but it is difficult to prove that 
someone has violated it.‛ Because this can be so tricky, Leblanc suggests looking to see 
if the same people are involved in a candidate committee and a political committee or if 
they use the same public relations firm or advertising agency.86 
 PACs. In Louisiana, political action committees (PACs) are either classified as 
candidate committees or political committees. Political committees are Louisiana’s 
equivalent to federal non-connected PACS. They are required to maintain 
independence from any candidate and have higher contribution and expenditure limits. 
For this reason, Louisiana PACs that avoid collusion with a candidate or candidate 
committee can put much more money into a given election.87 
 Issue Advocacy. Louisiana PACs, like federal PACs, often participate in issue 
advertising. In terms of regulating issue advocacy on the state level, Louisiana law does 
not directly address the problem. Whereas the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act sought 
to stop express advocacy disguised as issue advocacy (often referred to as pseudo-issue 
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advocacy) on the federal level, there is no such law for Louisiana campaigns. In a 1999 
advisory letter, however, the Louisiana Board of Ethics stated that ‚if the message is 
unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning, and if that meaning 
is an expression of preference of one candidate over another candidate, then the 
underlying contributions and expenditures should be reported as otherwise required by 
applicable provisions of the CFDA *Campaign Finance Disclosure Act+.‛ 88 In addition, 
in a 2005 opinion, imposing a $20,000 fine on the Republican State Leadership 
Committee, the Board held that the campaign finance disclosure requirements are 
applicable where ‚any viewer of the advertisement would understand, even without 
explicit word[s] of express advocacy, that when taken as a whole and in its factual 
context, the unmistakable intent of the advertisement was to oppose or otherwise 
influence an election.‛89 Issue advocacy has yet to be defined or included in Louisiana 
campaign finance statutes. These rulings suggest a need for address and clarification in 
the overall law.  
 In summary, this chapter outlines key components of federal campaign finance 
law, citing the rationale behind each. It addresses key campaign finance 
‚battlegrounds‛ including corporate participation, PAC participation, the use of  
pseudo-issue advocacy, and the use of supposedly independent expenditures. Finally, it 
highlights significant differences in Louisiana and federal campaign finance law, 
particularly the allowance of corporate contributions.   
                                                 
88 Louisiana Board of Ethics, Campaign Finance Advisory Op. No. 1999-580 (Sept. 17, 1999). 
89 Louisiana Board of Ethics, Campaign Finance Ruling No. 2003-746 (Jan. 13, 2005). 
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BRNEXT AND THE 2004 MAYORAL RACE 
L. Lane Grigsby, age 65, founded his contracting company, Cajun Constructors, 
in 1973.90  Over the next fifteen years the company experienced tremendous growth 
reaching $35 million in contract revenues. In 1998 it reached $139 million in revenues 
and has currently completed over $2 billion in contracts nationwide. Recently, the firm 
won state bids for several cleanup and reconstruction projects in New Orleans 
following Hurricane Katrina; these included helping to pump floodwater out of the city 
and rebuilding the Industrial Canal levee.91 In addition to owning Cajun Constructors, 
Grigsby serves on the board of Directors for The Shaw Group, a multi-million dollar 
contracting firm that has been named to Fortune magazines ‚Fortune 500 List‛ several 
times.92  He also has 16 active corporations and three political action committees 
registered with the state of Louisiana. 
 Generally speaking, according to Louisiana law Grigsby would have several 
conventional ways of affecting the election. As an individual he could contribute $5,000 
to the Kip Holden campaign. Also, as an individual, he could make unlimited 
expenditures in an effort to defeat Simpson or elect Holden by disclosing that the 
messages came from him, Lane Grigsby. Affecting politics is nothing new for Grigsby. 
He has been affecting elections since 1988 and has been involved in over 70 legislative 
                                                 
90 According to Forbes.com website. (Retrieved on June 19, 2007). 
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races.93 He is currently under investigation for coordination with a candidate in the 2006 
Senate race. He admittedly ‚whacked‛ one candidate, William Daniels, with $20,000 
worth of mailouts publicizing his divorce. Just recently, he took a full-page 
advertisement out in his local newspaper soliciting candidates to run for state 
representative.94 
As Grigsby’s political past illustrates, people are often rewarded for finding 
creative ways of stretching or manipulating the law in electoral politics. By making use 
of legal loopholes, the wealthy are able to inject larger amounts of money into the 
process than intended by law. This study is an example of such legal manipulation. 
Rather than using conventional avenues for spending, Grigsby made use of Louisiana’s 
vague and loophole-ridden laws by sending his money and his company’s money 
through various channels, thus, putting more money into the election than intended by 
law and doing so under the guise of an issue-based political committee. 
 Grigsby formed the PAC BRNext in January 2004. To achieve maximum electoral 
impact, Grigsby recruited well-connected political players to run it.95  He recruited 
media consultant George Kennedy, brother of Louisiana State Treasurer John Kennedy 
and former consultant to Lt. Governor Mitch Landrieu; executive director and 
spokesperson Caroline Roemer, daughter of former Louisiana Governor Buddy 
Roemer; and general consultant Pat Bergeron, former Louisiana BREC commissioner 
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and Assistant Elections Commissioner.96 As seasoned politicians and political 
consultants, BRNext’s managers were well trained to affect elections.  
 In the beginning, Kennedy and Grigsby presented BRNext to the public as a 
grassroots movement, comprising of members of the community. They promised that it 
would stay positive in tone and focus on the issues. Its website announced that BRNext 
‚formed as the next step to vigorously participate in local electoral politics.‛97 In 
addition, the PAC announced that it intended to make issue spots that would empower 
the people and the press to begin having an honest debate about the mayoral election.98 
 BRNext’s media plan included television spots, news releases, public relations 
events, and a website.  Television, the PAC’s primary medium, targeted what Kennedy 
called high-propensity voters, or those who had voted in the last six elections.99  
According to Kennedy, the news releases were not only targeted at the press, but at the 
Simpson campaign as well. He said the releases were designed as an element of ‚Psych-
op‛ or ‚psychological operation‛ aimed at the Bobby Simpson campaign. He said, 
‚Psychologically it stirs your opponent up, leaving them *sic+ chasing their tail.  It got 
*Simpson’s+ campaign off their message and caused them to be more modest about their 
product claims.‛100 BRNext used public relations events to attract and inform potential 
investors, and the website, abandoned shortly after the beginning of the campaign, 
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targeted interested individuals and the press.101  
 To ensure maximum impact, the group used software called TV Scan to find the 
perfect fit between the PAC’s budget and its target demographics.102  The breakout spot, 
a one-minute commercial depicting people around Baton Rouge with the tag: ‚The pain 
of change is the price of progress,‛103  attempted to achieve name identification and 
feelings of good will. Following this ad, BRNext’s message began to shift from broad 
issues toward more specific ones, including traffic and crime. The messages also shifted 
from blaming vague ‚leadership‛ to naming Simpson in particular. The second and 
fourth commercials discussed crime and traffic, blaming nonspecific Baton Rouge 
‚leadership.‛104 The third commercial listed Homeland Security expenditures by mayor-
incumbent Bobby Simpson including skittles and peppermint patties.105  The fifth 
commercial depicted two faceless candidates that expressed opposing views on various 
subjects. The commercial then revealed that both candidates were in fact Simpson.106 
The PAC’s negative campaign against Simpson culminated with a final television spot 
that depicted a baboon tossing money into the air while a voice-over said, ‚The mayor’s 
secret traffic plan; a north loop to nowhere. Simpson tried to hide it. On election day, 
don’t be fooled again.‛107  
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            As a result of the group’s shift to negative campaigning, many contributors 
pulled out of BRNext, and some demanded their money back.108 One member that 
pulled out, fundraiser Chris Hicks, said that he and other contributors felt that by 
violating its mission, BRNext betrayed the public and them. Another former member 
cited BRNext’s focus ‚on the agenda of its chairman, Lane Grigsby, who *was+ 
bankrolling the political action committee with loans‛ as his reason for leaving the 
group.109 In an interview, Kennedy claimed BRNext had to ‚shift gears‛ because other 
candidates failed to pick up on their anti-Simpson message.110 This statement, however, 
seems naïve considering that generally negative campaigning has often been the 
function of independent expenditures. As National Conservative Political Action 
Committee Chairman Terry Dolan said: ‚A group like ours can lie through its teeth, and 
the candidate it helps stays clean.‛111  
 According to Kennedy, this shifting of gears meant connecting the dots from the 
issues to Simpson, saying to voters, ‚See. Be mad at him.‛112 Grigsby defended the shift 
in tactics and mocked his critics for their naiveté. He attributed the exodus from BRNext 
to people’s ‚false sense of being engaged in politics,‛ because they gave ‚a little bit of 
money.‛ He said, ‚Some people gave me their money and trusted that I would perform 
in a manner which would not embarrass them. And I had to give some of them their  
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money back<They didn’t want to be a part of an attack on the current administration. 
It takes courage to tell the emperor he’s naked.‛113 
 Kennedy echoed Grigsby’s attitude, claiming neither he nor Grigsby cared if they 
angered its members or even voters. He said there was no real downside for BRNext. 
Had the group been unsuccessful at ousting Simpson, Kennedy said Simpson would 
still have taken ‚a major hickey‛ and BRNext would have been viable ‚with money still 
hammering on Simpson.‛ He summed this sentiment up in a mixed metaphor when he 
said, ‚We were baking a cake and didn’t know what kind of cake it was going to be. We 
just knew that when it came out the oven, it was gonna be cooked.‛ 
 At the end of the day, BRNext did indeed ‚cook‛ its cake. In November 2004, 
East Baton Rouge parish elected Holden as the first African-American mayor-president. 
Holden defeated incumbent Simpson by nearly 15,000 votes.114 While it is impossible to 
definitively link Holden’s success to BRNext’s campaign, research and opinions suggest 
a connection. Not surprisingly, Kennedy and Grigsby credited BRNext with having a 
significant impact on the election. Kennedy said follow-up polls suggested that BRNext 
stopped Simpson’s growth, boasting that ‚We capped his growth by killing him with 
paper cuts.‛115 Grigsby echoed this view, insisting that the ‚single thing that pulled 
Bobby Simpson down was BRNext<There is no doubt in my mind.‛116 Grigsby and 
Kennedy, however, were not the only ones who saw its impact. 
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 Media outlets agreed.  A pollster with Southern Media Opinion Research said 
‚Simpson may have been the only Republican in Louisiana who didn’t benefit from 
sharing the ballot with Bush.  US Senator David Vitter and US Representative Richard 
Baker, both Republicans, were strong in the parish, but when you come down to the 
mayor, it’s a different story, so there must have been something that was interjected 
into the race that had a profound impact, and guess who it was? BRNext.‛117  The 
pollster said he thinks at least part of Simpson’s problem was due to the ‚11th hour ad 
campaign launched by BRNext.‛118  
       The Greater Baton Rouge Business Report also considered BRNext to be a key 
ingredient to Simpson’s defeat:  
<BRNext!, despite complaints of negativity, managed to exploit Simpson's 
negatives, and the incumbent's only response was to attack Holden's legislative 
voting record. As one Republican who voted for Holden said, ‘Bobby never 
refuted the BRNext! charges. He only said it was negative campaigning and 
responded by going negative against Holden.’ Finally, there was a growing 
sense, real or not, by many in South Baton Rouge and elsewhere that Simpson 
was doing little to move Baton Rouge forward. In the end, it was all too much for 
Simpson to overcome.119  
Following the election, the defeated Simpson attested to the power of the group when 
he said: ‚Baton Rouge Next was a third-party, soft-money group, and if that’s what this 
public wants us to go through in the future, they’ve spoken.  I guess the public makes 
that decision.‛120 
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119 J. R. Ball, Why Simpson Lost, THE GREATER BATON ROUGE BUSINESS REPORT, Nov. 9, 2004. 
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 When challenged about BRNext’s influence on the election, Kennedy and 
Grigsby both insisted that their political involvement through BRNext came from 
altruistic motives.  Kennedy publicly asserted that BRNext, an entity supposedly 
backed by wealthy citizens practicing noblesse oblige, represented ‚the new 
philanthropy.‛121   However, that claim rang hollow when he privately boasted: ‚Give 
me $2 million and I don’t care who the governor is,‛ he said, ‚I can give them a 45 
percent negative.‛122 Grigsby also claimed his efforts were selfless, echoing Kennedy 
when he called BRNext part of the ‚philanthropic movement of the future,‛ where 
‚people recognize that they can make a larger impact with their wealth than they ever 
dreamed possible.‛ He even compared himself to Carnegie, saying he was using his 
wealth to better the community, only expecting good government in return.123 This 
study, however, suggests that the legal framework facilitates improper and cynical 
abuse of the system, resulting in the ‚appearance of corruption.‛124  
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WHAT BRNEXT MEANS FOR DEMOCRACY 
BRNext: Behind the Image  
 Interviews with Grigsby and Kennedy, and an in-depth look at campaign finance 
records, revealed that BRNext was a major financial endeavor by one individual, Lane 
Grigsby. Through this PAC, his corporations, his family, and contacts, Grigsby was able 
to funnel a large amount of money into the 2004 mayor’s race within Louisiana’s existing 
legal framework. In the areas where it appears that Grigsby and BRNext may have 
skirted the edge of legality or at least violated the spirit of Louisiana’s laws, the oversight 
and enforcement agency was either unaware of the violations, chose to ignore them, or 
was hindered by vague and loophole-ridden laws. BRNext, formed with the primary 
intent of ousting incumbent Mayor Bobby Simpson,125 was able to participate in the 
election in several ways. As a registered non-connected PAC, BRNext was able to 
circumvent contribution and expenditure restrictions through corporate contributions 
and loans, pseudo-issue advocacy, and ‚independent‛ expenditures. In addition, BRNext 
and Grigsby were able to avoid legal interference either by virtue of their personal clout 
with the enforcement agency or negligence on the agency’s part. This chapter outlines the 
ways in which BRNext and Grigsby were able to participate in the 2004 election, 
discusses what this means for democracy, and gives suggestions for policy change.  
  
                                                 
125 Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005); 
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (April 25, 2007). 
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Corporate Contributions & Unpaid Loans. At the heart of this discussion is the 
question of how BRNext was truly funded. In the spirit of the law, PACs are supposed 
to be funded by a collection of like-minded citizens who, by pooling their resources, can 
impact the electoral process. BRNext was not such a group. In an interview, Grigsby 
said he made an initial investment of $300,000 to BRNext through various financial 
avenues.126 According to Louisiana campaign finance law, individuals and corporations 
can give $100,000 to PACs. This limit includes loans and in-kind contributions. Records 
suggest that Grigsby funneled more than $450,000 into BRNext by the end of the 
mayoral election, using his companies, loans, and other individuals.127  
 According to the Louisiana Secretary of State’s commercial division’s 
corporations database, Grigsby has 31 registered corporations, 16 of which are active. 
Of these 16, three contributed to BRNext through loans. Loans made to BRNext 
included loans made by Grigsby, his company Cajun Contractors, his company Grigsby 
Properties, his wife Bobbi Grigsby, Cajun Contractors vice president Milton Graugnard, 
and a corporation which Grigsby is part owner, Kyle Associates. In 2004, Cajun 
Constructors loaned BRNext $140,382.58. (Again, under Louisiana law, loans are also 
subject to contribution limits.128 This loan, therefore, is a violation of the $100,000 
contribution limit.) BRNext reported a payment back to Cajun for $140,497.34. Grigsby 
Properties loaned BRNext $30,100, which BRNext reported returning. However, 
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Grigsby personally loaned BRNext $100,000 and has yet to be paid back. Grigsby said 
he loand BRNext the money in case others later decided to ‚jump on the bandwagon‛ 
and he could pay himself back.(Though he later said, he never intended to get the 
money back).129 His wife, Bobbi Grigsby loaned BRNext $50,000 and has yet to be paid 
back. Milton Graugnard, Cajun Contractors’ vice president, loaned BRNext $25,000 in 
2004 and has yet to be paid back. Finally, one of Grigsby’s companies, Kyle Associates, 
loaned BRNext $12,500 in 2005 and has yet to receive payment.  Beyond loans, 
Grigsby’s wife also made a contribution of $50,000 to BRNext. His company, Cajun 
Constructors, contributed $20,100, and his vice president contributed $30, 014.82.  
This was all done in accordance with Louisiana law as pertains to contributions 
to an independent PAC (with exception to the loan from Cajun Contractors). These 
loans and contributions are problematic, however, in two ways. First, the law states that 
it is illegal to give in the name of another.130 It is problematic, then, that Grigsby claims 
to have, himself, given BRNext $300,000.131 This suggests that Grigsby’s wife and vice 
president gave in his place. Secondly, had BRNext registered as a candidate PAC – and 
it clearly operated as one –  Grigsby and each of his entities would have only been 
permitted a $5,000 contribution each to BRNext, which would have severely diminished 
its coffers. Based on Grigsby’s statement and financial records, however, it appears that 
Grigsby, through his companies, his wife, and his vice president, gave BRNext a total of 
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$458,097.40 through contributions and loans.  Even following loan repayments, Grigsby 
himself spent $287,614.82.132  This is a prime example of how the law allows individuals 
to give more money than intended through their various entities.  
Grigsby acknowledged this vulnerability in the system: ‚If you want to get 
involved in a state legislature campaign they say you can only give $2,500. Per entity! 
I’ve got ten entities. I’m in for $25,000. It’s very easy. Now what you do is once you get 
in there, you start trying to shape people’s thought process.‛133 
            He further outlined his efforts when he said, ‚With BRNext what I did was I got 
a little bit of money from about 50 people<and then I put, or my entities that I 
incurred, put about $300,000 into the BRNext campaign [reports indicate it was more 
like $450,000+ <The fact of the matter is<within a PAC if you hold it tightly you can 
put enough money in there and not have to go knockin’ on doors.‛ Grigsby said he 
primarily used loans to put money into BRNext. When asked about being paid back, 
Grigsby said, ‚You put your money in, and you’re not going to get it back. I never 
intended to get it back.‛134 This raises questions about who monitors these loans to 
ensure they are legitimate and whether are not they are paid back or listed as defaulted 
on IRS forms. Without access to financial records it is difficult to determine whether 
Grigsby drew from his personal accounts or whether he, his wife, and vice president 
drew from the same corporate treasury.  
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 Finally, another contracting company in which Grigsby is on the board of 
directors, Shaw (now publicly owned and traded), contributed $50,000 to BRNext. 
Shaw’s founder, Jim Bernhard contributed $50,000. In addition, Jim Bernhard, his wife, 
and son contributed $15,000 to Kip Holden’s campaign. Bernhard, his family, and Shaw 
apparently approved of BRNext’s campaign, as they did not pull out of the group or 
request their money back following the PACs negative shift. While these contributions 
are in accordance with legal limits, they provide further connections between the two 
political camps and raise the question of whether contracting corporations, which 
actively seek contracts with the city and state, should be allowed to use their corporate 
wealth to affect campaigns.  
Issue Advocacy. Because Grigsby was able to put so much money into BRNext, 
he had access to expensive airtime, a prime means of reaching voters. BRNext reported 
a total of $311,963.61 spent on advertising and media buys. Because these ads avoided 
words of ‚express‛ advocacy, they were not subject to the same disclosure and 
contribution limits. Had the ads been treated as express advocacy, they would have 
been considered in-kind contributions, subject to the $5,000 limit. So, they would not 
have been permitted by law. 
 In a 2005 opinion, imposing a $20,000 fine on the Republican State Leadership 
Committee, the Louisiana Board of Ethics held that the campaign finance disclosure 
requirements and expenditure limits are applicable where ‚any viewer of the 
advertisement would understand, even without explicit word[s] of express advocacy,  
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that when taken as a whole and in its factual context, the unmistakable intent of the 
advertisement was to oppose or otherwise influence an election.‛135 
 Kennedy said that contrary to BRNext’s public image, the group formed with the 
primary intent of unseating incumbent Mayor Bobby Simpson.136 Grigsby confirmed 
this when he said, ‚It was ABB; Anybody But Bobby.‛137 Though BRNext’s commercials 
did not use the ‚magic words‛138 outlined in Buckley, they did explicitly advocate 
opposition to Simpson with lines like, ‚The mayor’s secret traffic plan, a north loop to 
nowhere. Simpson tried to hide it. On election day, don’t be fooled again.‛139 In an 
interview Grigsby said, ‚A third-party PAC can do whatever they want to. As long as 
you don’t endorse a candidate you can spend whatever you want to enhance his 
campaign.‛140 According to the Ethics Board, however, any advertisement that seeks to 
‚oppose or otherwise influence an election‛ 141 is express advocacy and should be 
considered an in-kind contribution, subject to contribution limits. 
 Under the Board of Ethics ruling, BRNext should have reported the commercials 
as in-kind expenditures for the Kip Holden campaign. In addition, the PAC should 
have been registered as a candidate committee, not a non-connected committee. Had it  
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done so, BRNext would have only been allowed to contribute $5,000 to the Holden 
campaign.142 Instead, BRNext reported a total of $311,963.61 spent on advertising and 
media buys.143   
 “Independent” Expenditures. BRNext was able to avoid candidate contribution 
limits by registering as a non-connected PAC. Therefore, its expenditures were deemed 
‚independent,‛ rather than coordinated with the Holden campaign. Although, again, 
this study does not attempt to undertake the task of definitively proving that 
coordination, the overlapping expenditures made by BRNext and the Holden campaign 
certainly give the appearance of such coordination – or, in other words, the appearance 
of corruption.  
 For its advertising campaign, BRNext hired well-known political consultant 
George Kennedy. In the past, Kennedy has worked with media consultant Rannah 
Gray, who was also Kip Holden’s144 media consultant and spokesperson.145  Under 
Louisiana campaign finance law, contributions include ‚expenditures made by any 
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, 
a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents and shall be considered 
to be a contribution to such a candidate.‛146 So, the fact that both Kennedy and Gray 
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worked together in the past and during this election, and the fact that they both worked 
out of the address 7650 Old Hammond Highway, at least gives the appearance of 
coordination.147 In addition, Gray is listed as a partner of Marmillion/Gray Marketing 
and Media. The Baton Rouge branch of Marmillion/Gray also lists the same Old 
Hammond Highway address as Compose Digital, the company that Kennedy and Gray 
both work out of.148   
 BRNext and the Holden campaign reported similar expenditures to these 
consultants and their companies. In campaign disclosure records BRNext reported 
expenditures to Kennedy, Kennedy’s employer Compose Digital Design, and Gray’s 
company Gray Marketing and Media. The PAC reported $47,264.90 paid to Compose 
Digital Design, $72,000 to Kennedy, and $230,434 to Gray Marketing and Media. In 
disclosure reports, Holden similarly reported expenditures to Compose Digital, 
Kennedy’s employer; Marmillion/Gray, Gray’s company; and Rannah Gray herself. 
Holden reported paying $928 to Compose Digital, $14,000 to Marmillion/Gray, and 
$234,104 to Rannah Gray. While it is difficult to prove conclusively that Kennedy and 
Gray worked together on the 2004 mayor’s race, working out of the same office and 
receiving money from both BRNext and Holden is compelling information and enough 
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to prove at least the ‚appearance of corruption.‛149 To avoid this, BRNext’s expenditures 
should have been reported as in-kind contributions or coordinated expenditures, which 
would have been subject to limits. 
 Oversight/Enforcement. Not only are BRNext’s consulting relationships 
troubling, so too is its connection with the oversight and enforcement agency, the Board 
of Ethics. Gray Sexton150 is the appointed Ethics Administrator, serving as general 
counsel to the board,151 managing the collection and dissemination of any material or 
reports required to be filed with the board pursuant to any law,152 and sometimes, after 
consultation with the Chairman of the board, issuing advisory opinions.153 It is therefore 
troubling that Gray Sexton is listed as a registered agent for 18 of Grigsby’s 31 
registered corporations, and as director of one. An employee of Sexton, Alice Diez, is 
listed as the registered agent of BRNext. In addition, the address listed for BRNext is 
that of ‚The Law Offices of Gray Sexton.‛154 Diez is also listed as the registered agent of 
Grigsby’s two new PACs, TigerPAC and LANext.  
 Sexton’s position is a Louisiana Civil Service position, and as such, is under civil 
service rules and regulations. Under Chapter 14 in the Civil Service Rules, Louisiana 
employees are prohibited from engaging in political activity and taking ‚active part in 
the management of affairs of a political party, faction, candidate, or any political 
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campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen to express his opinion privately.‛155 
According to the Board of Ethics Rules, a ‚public servant is prohibited from receiving 
any thing of economic value for any service which<is substantially related to the duties 
and responsibilities, programs, or operations of the agency of the public servant.‛156 
Under these rules, neither Sexton nor his employee should have been involved with 
BRNext or Grigsby. 
 Also, ‚any legal entity in which the public servant exercises control or 25%, is 
prohibited from receiving any thing of economic value for services rendered to<any 
person who conducts operations or activities which are regulated by the employee’s 
agency; OR any person who has a substantial economic interest which may be 
substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the public employee’s 
official job.‛157 Because Grigsby and BRNext registered with the Board of Ethics and 
because Grigsby stands to benefit from Sexton’s ‚nonperformance,‛ this relationship is 
a violation of rules. In addition, as a civil service employee, the ethics administrator is 
expected to work at least 40 hours a week and can earn from $47,570 and $119,267 a 
year.158 It is questionable that Sexton can maintain a law firm, servicing clients like 
Grigsby, and act full-time as Ethics Administrator.  
 During this study, the Louisiana House of Representatives approved a bill to 
restrict the legal practices of Sexton outside of his state work. This came as a result of a 
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March 2006 dispute in which members of the Jefferson Parish Council sought Ethics 
Board intervention when Lane Grigsby’s Cajun Constructors hired Kyle Associates (a 
company in which Grigsby held a 26% interest in) to inspect their work building safe 
houses for east bank pump operators. Sexton appeared before the council as Grigsby’s 
attorney, not as Ethics Board chief. He was also a registered agent for both Cajun 
Constructors and Kyle Associates at the time. 159 
           Whether or not Sexton’s relationship with Grigsby affected his role as Ethics 
Administrator in the case of BRNext cannot be proven. The possibility and perception 
of unethical activity, however, is damaging to the electoral process and a direct 
violation of civil service rules.  
 In addition to problems with the structure of the oversight and enforcement 
agency, there are problems with the procedures of enforcement. As former Deputy 
General Counsel of the Louisiana Ethics Board, Maris LeBlanc, said, ‚Without someone 
filing a complaint it would be difficult to investigate and take action<It takes someone 
with knowledge to put it all together and point that out to *the Ethics Board+.‛ 
According to the Board’s procedure for filing complaints, ‚it takes a vote of at least 
eight *of 11+ members of the Board to refer a complaint to investigation.‛160 Complaints 
concerning election integrity must include a ‚receipt of a sworn statement by any voter  
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of this state alleging error, fraud, irregularity, or other unlawful activity in the conduct 
of an election<‛161 These requirements put a large burden of proof on average citizens.  
 This section has outlined the ways in which BRNext and Grigsby were able to 
inject a large amount of money into the 2004 election using various campaign finance 
loopholes in a vague campaign finance framework of laws. A lack of oversight by the 
Ethics Board and corporate contributions and loans, pseudo-issue advertising, and 
independent expenditures, Grigsby was able to open the electoral process up to at least 
the appearance of corruption. He used his corporate and personal wealth to contribute 
to and ‚loan‛ BRNext enough money to purchase large amounts of broadcast time to 
air ads that supposedly addressed issues but, in reality, were attacks on Simpson. He 
did so by creating a political action committee, projected to the public as a grassroots 
movement. The next section will discuss each particular loophole used by Grigsby, how 
each affects democracy, and how each might be prevented in the future. 
BRNext and Democracy 
 The case of BRNext strengthens the argument that people of wealth can possess a 
disproportionate voice in politics by either manipulating or simply ignoring campaign 
finance laws. As West argues in Checkbook Democracy, the courts ‚mistakenly have 
equated freedom of speech with freedom to spend.‛162 Not only are interest groups and 
large corporations able to use financial leverage to affect elections, but one person of 
means can as well. The use of PACs, pseudo-issue advocacy, and campaign 
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electioneering denigrates elections, causes cynicism and voter apathy, and hinders 
accountability (whether real or perceived) for elected officials.  
 The question of whether Grigsby’s actions were in accordance with the law or in 
violation of it is a difficult one to answer. So far, this type of behavior has been 
permitted by loophole-ridden, vague, or unenforced laws. In terms of federal law, West 
contends: ‚What used to represent a reasonably clear set of rules for the game now has 
given way to a bewildering variety of tangled laws, confusing regulations, blatant 
loopholes, and selective enforcement of what guidelines remain‛163 resulting in ‚the 
toleration of big contributions from privileged elements within society<‛164 Those 
against campaign finance reform discount these claims and the notion that without 
reform economic inequalities give the wealthy a disproportionate share of influence in 
politics.165 BRNext is evidence that this statement also holds true for Louisiana law.  
 The evidence in the case of BRNext and the 2004 mayoral election furthers the 
argument put forth by those in favor of further reform. By funneling money through a 
‚non-connected‛ PAC, Grigsby was able to purchase large amounts of broadcast 
advertising time to air thinly veiled anti-Simpson commercials. In addition, he was able 
to hire a savvy, well-connected political consultant to man his attack against Simpson. 
Finally, as a wealthy individual he was able to hire a prominent attorney who is also 
administrator of the oversight and enforcement agency and could advise him of the 
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ways to legally circumvent the law. This section will discuss each of the areas addressed 
in the previous section, give suggestions for policy change, and draw conclusions about 
what this means for democracy. 
 Corporate Donations and Unpaid Loans. As outlined in the previous section, 
Grigsby and his various entities were able to contribute, through contributions and 
unpaid loans, more than $450,000 to BRNext166 in an effort to ‚shape people’s thought 
process.‛167 
 It is problematic when people of wealth, especially people who own corporations 
that stand to benefit from close connections with elected officials, are allowed to put 
large amounts of money into affecting an election. It is problematic in terms of opening 
the door for political corruption and it is problematic in terms of political equality. 
When the democracy shifts from the logic of ‚one person-one vote‛ to the market logic 
of ‚may the highest bidder win,‛ the wealthy dominate and the poor are powerless. 
Money becomes an exclusionary mechanism for eliminating poorer candidates and 
muting the voices of poorer constituents. 
  How can this problem be solved? Is the answer more stringent financial 
restrictions? Grigsby said the reality of politics is that there are currently no financial 
restrictions: ‚When we hide from reality, we pretend that the situation is not what it 
really is. We are deluded and misguided. I will guarantee right now that the money, if 
you really want to, you can find out how to put it in<Most smart people try to do it 
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completely legally. There are many loopholes.‛ He said he thinks efforts to safeguard 
against money’s corrupting power of politics are futile: ‚money and politics is kind of 
like trying to keep water in a straw basket. You can run around and put a piece of gum 
on that leak and its going to come out somewhere else. Money is gonna come out in 
politics<You are not going to get the influence of power and money out of politics. It’s 
just not going to happen.‛   
 One solution provided on the federal level, however, has been a ban on corporate 
contributions. Had this been in effect in Louisiana, it would have been more difficult for 
Grigsby to put so much money into the election. In addition to contributions, corporate 
loans should be prohibited and personal loans should be limited to contribution limits, 
require greater disclosure of information, and be monitored to ensure they are paid 
back.  
 Issue Advocacy. As stated previously, Grigsby was able to use the money 
funneled into BRNext to purchase $311,963.61 worth of advertising and media time. The 
ads, which avoided words of ‚express‛ advocacy, were not subject to the same 
disclosure and contribution limits as coordinated expenditures. 
 This example illustrates that the vague differentiation between express and issue 
advocacy is meaningless on the ground level. As in the case of BRNext, the current law 
allows individuals and groups to spend unlimited amounts on pro- and anti- candidate 
campaigns by avoiding key words. Disclosure requirements of the past no longer 
provide sufficient accountability for today’s political activity. As Grigsby said, ‚The 
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political process is evolving more rapidly than it used to. We are the age of information. 
The influx of the speed of transmission of information is going to alter the process of 
selection of our leadership. People of means are now understanding how to use the 
power of their means in a more effective manner.‛168  
 It has been difficult to solve this problem without infringing on free speech of 
groups that truly wish to address issues of concern. Some suggest addressing the issue 
of where the money comes from, rather than scrutinizing the purpose of the message. 
They suggest corporations should be barred from paying for issue advocacy with funds 
from the corporate treasury. Instead, advocacy should be paid for with funds obtained 
from voluntary contributions and kept separate from the organization’s general 
treasury.169 Others argue that the answer is allowing more money into the system by 
way of campaign contributions. They argue that ‚to reduce issue advertising as a way 
to bring greater accountability to elections (i.e., making it easier for voters to know who 
is paying for advertising), then perhaps existing restrictions on candidate contributions 
should be removed.‛170 This suggestion, however, seems like a trade-off of one evil for 
another. 
 More promising is West’s suggestion that would require issue ads to keep 
sponsor identification visible for the duration of the advertisement. In addition, West 
suggests ads listing of the people who primarily fund the ‚organization.‛ He says, 
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AND POLITICS 487 (1997). 
170 Robert E. Hogan, State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group Electioneering Activities, 67 JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS 887 (2005) at 904. 
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‚Hiding behind nebulous organization names like Citizens for Reform tells voters 
nothing about the messenger. It matters who pays for ads and is behind the political 
activity they urge.‛171  
 West takes this a step further and suggests that candidates should receive free 
airtime in exchange for voluntarily accepting spending limits.172 Such free airtime has 
shown promise in other countries. For example, public broadcasters in France and 
Britain have an obligation to give free airtime to politicians during elections. In France, 
the government allots each candidate and party an equal amount of free time on radio 
and television.173 Similarly, in Britain, broadcasters make a joint offer of free airtime to 
the principal political parties. In exchange for this time, ‚neither political parties nor 
individual candidates are allowed to buy time for political advertising.‛174 Such free 
airtime would reduce candidates’ dependence on private money and the use of pseudo-
issue advocacy to corrupt the process. Such a suggestion was made by the defeated 
2003 McCain-Feingold bill which required all television and radio stations to air a 
minimum of two hours a week of programming centered on the election, each election 
cycle. It also required stations to provide a limited amount of free advertising time to 
qualified candidates. Paul Taylor, former Washington Post reporter and founder of Free 
TV for Straight Talk Coalition, ‚insists that free airtime is the most efficient and 
practical way to reform how this nation finances its political campaigns, since paying 
                                                 
171 DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 186 (2000).  
172 Id. at 174.  
173 Patrick Basham, The Illiberal Reality of European-Style Campaign Reform, THE CATO INSTITUTE (March 13, 
2002). Available at www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3417 
174 Richard Somerset, Public Interest Obligations in Broadcasting: International Comparisons, 1 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY & PRACTICE  (April 16, 1999). 
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for airtime is what so inflates campaign cost.‛175 In addition, Taylor says it is a way to 
‚wean the political system from so-called ‘soft money.’‛176  
  “Independent” Expenditures. As explained previously, BRNext was able to 
avoid candidate contribution limits by registering as a non-connected PAC. Its 
expenditures, therefore, were deemed ‚independent,‛ rather than coordinated 
expenditures. Despite this ‚independent‛ label, the BRNext and Holden campaigns 
made multiple payments to the same consulting firms.  
 Grigsby highlighted problematic characteristics of ‚independent‛ expenditures. 
He pointed out that where previously PACs began under the idea that a consensus 
would be formed among many people, in order to help make choices that were 
beneficial to all, they now serve as fronts for independent expenditures. In the case of 
BRNext, Grigsby said, ‚I was the consensus.‛ He also said in this new generation, ‚I 
don’t need to spend the time going out and getting a big group consensus to come give 
me money, because when you collect a group and lead them on a mission, it’s kind of 
like being a pastor in a church, there’s always someone in the congregation that doesn’t 
like the message<So, the fewer you have to please, the better the message is received. 
So by not getting as many people into decision-making roles by way of their checkbook, 
I am a lot freer.‛ 177 
  
                                                 
175 Joe Holley, The Solution: Free Airtime, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (May/June 1997). Available at 
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176 Paul Taylor, Clean up Politics with Free Airtime for Ads, 68 ADVERTISNG AGE 30 (April 28, 1997). 
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            This one-man consensus is not only problematic in terms of political equality, but 
also in terms of disclosure when it is projected to the public as a grassroots movement 
comprised of people from the community. BRNext’s first commercial said, ‚We are 
BRNext; A group of people just like you; in search of answers; in search of 
leadership.‛178 That is very different from the way Grigsby described BRNext. This 
raises the question, had BRNext been subject to greater disclosure, revealing BRNext 
(AKA Grigsby) to the public as it truly was, would the public have accepted its message 
in the same way?  Is it the intent of the democratic process to allow one individual to 
use his money to ‚derail the election bids of candidates they don’t like?‛179  
 When questioned about the ethics of this, Grigsby echoed the sentiment put forth 
by the Court in Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright180 when he said it is the 
responsibility of the public to ‚discern between good and evil.‛ He blames uneducated 
voters for falling prey to the promises of dishonest politicians: ‚Our problem with 
democracy is that uneducated, uninformed, poor people have learned that they can 
improve their lot in life by voting themselves a raise from the public treasury.‛181 
 If, according to Grigsby, the public is responsible to be more informed, how can 
they do so when the information is not readily available? With the proliferation of these 
new political actors and new routes for covert candidate spending, it is imperative that 
disclosure requirements be broadened and strengthened. It is necessary for enforcement 
                                                 
178 Commercial: TV Spot 1- Introduction (Available at www.brnext.org) 
179 Marsha Shuler, Third-parties’ Nasty Attacks Signal Trend, THE ADVOCATE, January 17, 2007.   
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agencies to identify these supposedly non-connected PACS, which are operating like 
candidate committees, and hold them to the correct contribution and disclosure 
requirements. Also, as West suggests, when broadcasting advertisements these groups 
should be required to list major contributors. In this way, the public can identify these 
groups as they are and choose whether to accept or reject their messages. 
 Oversight/Enforcement. Finally, the case of BRNext is an extreme example of the 
failure of the oversight and enforcement agency to even keep up the appearance of a 
functioning check on the system. While it is unlikely that Sexton is personally connected 
with every PAC in Baton Rouge, his relationship to Grigsby sheds a light on the 
system’s potential for corruption. Beyond the extracurricular activities of agency 
members, lies the problem of agency protocol. This system of relying on lay people to 
research and report violations in order to bring about investigation is totally ineffective. 
Such nonperformance is detrimental to democracy. Without proper oversight and 
enforcement, campaign finance laws are meaningless. The system requires scrupulous 
enforcement. The oversight and enforcement agency must be structured in a way to 
foster and oversee ethical behavior. In addition, the enforcement agency must not only 
be empowered to levy severe penalties for the violation of the law, but must also actively 
monitor campaign on goings. 
            In the case of BRNext, there are specific requirements that would have aided the 
Ethics Board in overseeing financial activity. First, in addition to reporting expenditures 
and contributions, had receipts with more information been submitted, identification of 
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unethical behavior would have been more plausible. If the Ethics Board had been given 
the authority to demand detailed financial records when necessary, it would have been 
more probable that the agency would identify when money was handled in an illegal or 
unethical manner. Also, had the rules regulating members of the oversight and 
enforcement agency from managing political activities outside of the office been 
enforced, then the Ethics Administrator’s relationship to Grigsby would not raise such 
ethical questions. 
 In conclusion, to protect the integrity of democracy, Louisiana campaign finance 
law requires reform. It requires, at the very least, a ban on corporate contributions and 
expenditures, stronger contribution and loan limits, more detailed disclosure 
requirements, and more active oversight and enforcement.  
Protecting the Future of Democracy  
 BRNext is an example of how wealthy corporations and individuals dominate 
the political discourse in America today, opening the door to ‚corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.‛182 As Raskin said, this ‚involves a massive structural bias in 
government favoring the parochial interests of corporate and personal wealth over the 
interests of those citizens lacking access to such wealth.‛183 As outlined in Buckley this 
corruption justifies the compelling governmental interest to further restrict campaign 
finance. The argument that money is speech is insufficient reason to allow such 
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corruption to exist. While it is true that sometimes money is necessary to purchase 
certain avenues for speech, such as television airtime, if speech can only be bought then 
it is no longer free. When speech can only be bought, those without wealth are left 
speechless. Democracy is not for sale. When it is put on the auction block of the 
marketplace, as it is currently, it is bought up by the wealthy and powerful, resulting in 
a superficial democracy where there is less speech, less diverse speech, corruption, and 
apathy. Acknowledge more. Whereas on one side you have those who argue for a sort 
of social Darwinism with the unfettered marketplace of ideas, the other side is for a 
more diverse marketplace, idea of egalitarianism. 
This problem is not going away. In a very recent ruling, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life (WRTL),184 the U. S. Supreme Court struck down certain applications of the BCRA’s 
restriction on issue advocacy communications, an attempt to prohibit corporations from 
purchasing such communications with general (non-PAC) funds. In his dissent, Justice 
Souter argued:  
Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of 
political campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to 
represent its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to 
govern themselves. These are the elements summed up in the notion of 
political integrity, giving it a value second to none in a free society. 
 
He continued by writing that campaign finance reform evidences that political 
corruption is not limited to quid-pro quo political corruption, and that political integrity is 
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most threatened by the ‚pervasive distortion of electoral institutions by concentrated 
wealth, on the special access and guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of 
American government and defy public confidence in its institutions.‛185 
 Whether or not the aforementioned policy changes would resolve these problems 
resulting in a more ethical and level political playing field is up for debate. There are those 
that believe like Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O’Conner, ‚Money, like water, 
will always find an outlet.‛186 Grigsby echoed Stevens and O’Conner’s sentiment when he 
said, ‚‚Politics and money are just like water and air. You can’t keep water and air out of 
things. If there are little holes or open areas, they’ll find out where that little opening is. The 
mother milk of politics is money.‛187 West argues that ‚*u+ntil the courts recognize the need 
to balance freedom of expression with the equally important principles of openness, 
fairness, and equitable electoral competitions, there can be no meaningful reform.‛188 
            If something is not done soon, however, cases such as BRNext will become 
commonplace. Long before BRNext, Grigsby said he started in parish politics. Now he 
intends to go statewide. He said, ‚I’ve been involved in 70 legislative races. Through 
various PACs<I get PACs for everything<‛ He said he began affecting elections in 1988 
when he helped oust Pat Screen as mayor. Since then, he said he used his PAC Business 
Congress of Louisiana to try to affect the 2004 Governor’s race.  
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            As of this study, Grigsby and BRNext are under investigation by the Ethics Board 
for supposed collusion in the 2006 Senate race. In an interview Grigsby said, ‚I recruited 
Dr. Bill Cassidy to run for senate. So, I was gonna give him a little bit of help.‛ Grigsby said 
he ‚whacked‛ Cassidy’s opponent, William Daniels, with $20,000 worth of mailouts 
publicizing his divorce.189 In December 2006 Daniels filed a complaint with the Ethics Board 
alleging that Cassidy and BRNext illegally colluded in violation of state campaign laws. 
Despite Grigsby’s comment that he ‚recruited‛ Cassidy and that he ‚was gonna give him a 
little bit of help,‛ Cassidy denied any connection with the BRNext mailouts.190 Once this 
investigation is resolved, Grigsby said he would like to affect state-wide politics with his 
new PAC LANext.  
 In 2007, Grigsby took a full-page advertisement out in The Advocate newspaper 
soliciting candidates to run against state Representative Bodi White. In an interview with 
The Advocate Grigsby said he was angry with White for a pro-union vote on plumbing 
legislation. White argued that he was voting for his constituency.191 Grigsby said he was 
just putting the ‚first spotlight on the first cockroach.‛192 In another interview, when asked 
about safeguarding democracy against the corrupting-power of money, Grigsby said, ‚I’m 
gonna tell you, third parties are here. You can leverage a dollar beyond belief. Can it be 
used viciously and mean-spiritedly? Yes! It will be! I’m not policeman of the world.‛193 
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            While there will always be those like Grigsby that try to exploit or even violate the 
system, however, it is the job of the government to attempt to protect and ensure the right 
to open, fair, ethical, and equitable elections.  It is imperative that laws protect against ‚the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.‛194 Because politics, elections, and campaign 
financing are forever changing, the laws must continue to adapt to include new actors and 
financial avenues and ensure that those without money still have a voice. BRNext is 
evidence that the laws of the past are ineffective in today’s campaign finance environment. 
The government should and must protect elections from wealthy hijackers. Regulation 
alone, though, is not a panacea. To have an open, fair, ethical, and equitable democracy 
requires an electorate that is committed to such an ideal and will thus demand that 
campaign finance laws are not just passed by legislatures, but enforced by accountable 
oversight bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Id. at 654, 659-60. 
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